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Abstract
 Substandard and falsified medicines undermine healthIntroduction:
systems. We sought to unravel the political and economic factors which
drive the production of these products, and to explain how they reach
patients.
 We conducted in-depth case studies in China, Indonesia, TurkeyMethods:
and Romania. We reviewed academic papers and press reports (n = 840),
developing semi-structured questionnaires. We interviewed regulators,
policy-makers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, physicians, pharmacists,
patients and academics (n=88). We coded data using NVivo software, and
developed an analytic framework to assess national risks for substandard
and falsified medicines. We tested the framework against cases reported to
the World Health Organization, from countries at all income levels.
 We found that increasing political commitment to provision ofResults:
universal health coverage has led to public procurement policies aimed at
lowering prices of medical products. In response, legitimate, profit-driven
pharmaceutical companies protect their margins by cutting costs, or
withdrawing from less profitable markets, while distributors engage in
arbitrage. Meanwhile, health providers sometimes protect profits by
'upselling' patients to medicines not covered by insurers. Cost-cutting can
undermine quality assurance, leading to substandard or degraded
medicines. Other responses contribute to shortages, irrational demand and
high prices. All of these provide market opportunities for producers of
falsified products; they also push consumers outside of the regular supply
chain, providing falsifiers with easy access to customers. The analytic
framework capturing these interactions explained cases in most high and
middle-income settings; additional factors operate in the poorest countries.
 Most efforts to secure medicine quality currently focus onConclusions:
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  Most efforts to secure medicine quality currently focus onConclusions:
product regulation. However, our research suggests market mechanisms
are key drivers for poor quality medicines, including where political
commitments to universal health coverage are under-resourced. We have
developed a framework to guide country-specific, system-wide analysis.
This can flag risks and pinpoint specific actions to protect medicine quality,
and thus health.
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Introduction
Substandard and falsified medical products undermine the pros-
pect of achieving effective universal health coverage (UHC)1. 
They waste money, fail to cure sick people, and sometimes 
even kill them. Reviews of in vitro, animal, observational and 
modelling studies conclude that anti-infective medicines that 
deliver sub-therapeutic doses because of poor formulation or 
degradation also encourage drug-resistant infections2,3. A 2017 
analysis of 1,500 cases of suspect medicines reported to the 
World Health Organisation Global Surveillance and Monitoring 
System for substandard and falsified medical products (the 
WHO GSMS database) showed that they exist in all regions of 
the world and affect all classes of medicines. Recently published 
meta-analyses of prevalence studies suggest that between 10 
and 20 percent of anti-infective medicines in low- and middle- 
income countries might be substandard or falsified4–6.
The problem is not new. The WHO outlined factors facilitat-
ing the manufacture and trade in poor quality medicines and 
recommended measures to tackle the problem as early as 19997. 
Some 18 years later, in 2017, it published a report whose find-
ings and recommendations were remarkably similar. Both reports 
grouped factors that facilitate the production and circulation 
of falsified and substandard medicines into three broad areas: 
•    Access-related: shortages of affordable, accessible, 
acceptable, quality-assured medicine;
•    Governance-related: weak legislation and sanctions, 
corruption;
•    Limited technical capacity: limitations among regulators, 
investigators, prosecutors, laboratories etc., as well as 
among producers and throughout the supply chain.
Other reviews have cited similar factors, and have proposed simi-
lar response strategies for prevention, detection and response, 
underlining, like WHO, the need to strengthen national medicines 
regulatory agencies8.
This begs the question: if both the drivers of poor-quality medi-
cines and the solutions have been known for two decades, 
why does the problem persist? We hypothesised that previous 
approaches correctly diagnose the immediate drivers, but did not 
sufficiently consider the specific political and economic factors 
which shape the markets for substandard and for falsified 
medicines, and which may stand in the way of proposed policy 
responses.
We thus conducted detailed, qualitative case studies in four 
middle-income countries which are significant producers and 
consumers of pharmaceuticals. We aimed to identify specific 
mechanisms through which political, economic and other sys-
temic factors influence the availability of substandard and falsified 
medicines and vaccines, and the ways in which they enable or 
obstruct policies aimed at reducing the production, trade and 
consumption of those products. On the basis of our findings, 
we further aimed to develop an analytic framework that can be 
used at the national level to identify policies and practices 
that create risks for substandard production or degradation of 
medical products, or that provide opportunities for market entry 
of falsified products.
Methods
Our team consisted of specialists in epidemiology, criminol-
ogy, medicine marketing and regulation, economics and public 
policy. We used WHO’s 2017 definitions, adopting “substandard” 
to refer to medical products that do not meet quality standards, 
and “falsified” to describe those that deliberately misrepresent 
identity, composition or source, and excluding patent-related 
considerations9.
Table 1 summarises the steps we took during this two-phase 
study.
Table 1. Summary of study steps.
Phase 1: Deductive approach 
Initial literature review: n ≅ 625
Developed initial working theory using critical interpretative synthesis
Developed a draft coding structure for data analysis in NVivo software
Selected countries for case studies, matching countries to key themes identified in initial literature review, 
working theory, and staff skills
Phase 2: Grounded theory approach 
Country-specific review of literature, court reports, institutional & press reports. n ≅ 215
Conducted 88 semi-structured interviews in four countries
Transcribed interviews, translated them into English
Coded interviews in NVivo software
Iteratively identified common patterns and differences in weekly team meetings; developed draft framework
Presented case study results and Market Risk Framework to informal study advisory panel
Integrated feedback; tested & revised framework against 14 cases from the WHO case reporting database
Finalised framework
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Literature review
We began by searching for evidence related to the causes and con-
sequences of substandard and falsified medicines. We searched 
PubMed, MEDLINE, the WHO Essential Medicines and Health 
Products Information Portal and Google Scholar using the 
keywords “counterfeit” (which was, until the 2019 revision, 
the Medical Subject Heading used for poor quality medicines), 
“substandard”, “falsified” or “poor quality” in combination 
with “medicin*”, “medical products” or “pharmaceutical*”. We 
identified further publications from bibliographies.
We reviewed resulting publications using critical interpretive 
synthesis—an iterative method designed for analysing hetero-
geneous qualitative data and developing theory10,11. Early in the 
process, we developed a coding structure centred on factors that 
created a market opportunity for poor-quality medicines, as well 
as factors that motivate, facilitate, or deter their production or 
trade. We entered this structure into NVivo software v1212, using 
it to code further reading and refining it inductively. It reached 
near-final form before the country case studies were conducted. 
We provide the final coding structure along with a log of changes 
to coding during iterative analysis in the study repository 
(see Extended data; 02_Coding_structure.docx13).
Choice of countries
We chose to conduct studies in middle-income countries because 
many, including several with large populations, are now actively 
pursuing policies designed to achieve or sustain UHC, while 
at the same time trying to increase domestic capacity for the 
production of pharmaceuticals. In addition, many are facing a 
“double burden” of disease, and demand is rising for new 
treatments for non-communicable diseases, as well as those for 
neglected and common infectious diseases. Such countries thus 
provide learning across a wide range of issues; this learning may 
also be useful to lower income countries that are now considering 
increasing public financing for health.
In our initial reading, we also identified structural character-
istics with potentially significant implications for medicine 
quality, as described in the Results section below. To the extent 
possible, we chose to conduct case studies in countries that 
displayed one of these characteristics. Finally, wishing to search 
literature and conduct interviews in local languages where 
possible, we considered the language skills of our research team. 
Once countries had been selected for case studies, we searched 
national institutional websites as well as the internet for sources 
relating to substandard and falsified medicines in Chinese, 
Indonesian, Turkish and Romanian.
Field research
We developed question guides based on our literature review, 
with variations for particular sub-studies (see Extended data; 
11_Interview_topic_guide.docx13). Potential respondents were 
purposively selected based on their knowledge of the manufac-
ture, regulation, trade, prescription or consumption of medicines; 
further respondents were suggested by participants. We con-
tacted them electronically and explained the purpose of the 
study. Consenting respondents (n=88) were provided with further 
details in writing in their native language, including around 
procedures to maintain confidentiality, then interviewed face-
to-face or by Skype for between 60 and 90 minutes. Consent to 
record was sought. Where granted (n= 65) consent was repeated 
on tape. Where denied (n=14) or technically impractical (n=10), 
consent to take written notes was sought, and written consent for 
interview was obtained. Most interviews were conducted in the 
respondent’s native language; staff of international organisations 
were interviewed in English.
Data processing, analysis and testing
Recorded interviews were transcribed and translated into English 
in full or in part by the interviewer. Where no recording was 
possible, notes were typed in English. Researchers coded their 
own interviews in a shared NVivo project; the principal investi-
gator (EP) coded a subset of interviews in parallel—differences 
in coding were discussed in weekly team meetings to develop 
shared understanding around key concepts. More details of par-
ticipant recruitment, interviews and data handling, reported 
following COREQ guidelines14, is provided in the study reposi-
tory (see Reporting guidelines; 03_COREQ_medicine_quality_ 
study_info_form.docx13).
We used a grounded theory approach in developing a coher-
ent framework based on the similarities between country case 
studies15. A draft analytic framework was developed and presented 
to an informal study advisory group in April 2018 (see 
Acknowledgements). It was revised following input from the 
group.
We then collaborated with colleagues at WHO, asking them 
to identify cases they considered illustrative of the breadth of 
reports of substandard and falsified medicines logged in the 
GSMS database. The selected cases included reports from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (×2), Nicaragua, Niger, Paki-
stan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela, as 
well as cross-border and regional cases involving China, France, 
India, Paraguay, the Middle East and West Africa (×3). We 
mapped these cases on to the market risk framework, to ascer-
tain the extent to which the factors identified in the framework 
explained the dynamics of each case.
Ethical approval
The Daily Board of the Medical Ethics Committee of Erasmus 
University reviewed the study plan and questionnaires and 
approved the protocol with number MEC-2018-016. National 
guidelines in all of the concerned countries specify that local 
ethical approval must be sought for invasive, but not non-invasive 
research. We discussed the study with officials in the Ministry 
of Health and/or medicine regulatory authorities (at the provin-
cial level in China and at the national level in other countries) 
before the start of data collection to ensure that they were fully 
aware of the aims of our work.
Study funders were consulted over final study design; funders 
had no role in analysis, manuscript development or decision to 
submit for publication.
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Results
These results bring findings derived from our review of litera-
ture and documentation together with data collected in semi- 
structured interviews. Where no specific reference is given, the 
finding comes from interview data.
Altogether, we reviewed some 840 papers and documents 
relating to medicine quality and product falsification in seven 
languages, and interviewed 88 people. We provide a full down-
loadable bibliography of all documents reviewed.in the study 
repository (see Extended data; 04_Bibliography.ris13).
Global overview from literature: contributors to poor 
quality medicines
Many of the academic research papers we found reported sur-
veys of the prevalence of poor-quality medicines in low income 
countries6. The academic literature also provided many com-
mentaries that summarised existing evidence. Some stressed 
the importance of market factors16, and several called for greater 
political commitment to addressing the threat posed by poor qual-
ity medicines17–19. However, few of these provide any detailed 
analysis of the reasons why that commitment is currently lacking.
Books and institutional reports were more likely to provide 
information about factors facilitating the circulation of poor- 
quality medicines, as described in the Introduction4,5,7,8,20–25. 
These documents generally agree on the circumstances com-
monly associated with poor quality medicines: shortages of 
affordable, quality-assured medicine; weak legislation and sanc-
tions; under-resourced regulators with poor technical capacity; 
complex supply chains; and corruption. We used these areas of 
agreement to inform our coding structure and interview guides.
However, we found no global analyses which described how these 
factors relate to one another, or to the political and economic 
landscapes in which they are rooted.
Much of the remainder of the literature fell into two catego-
ries: studies of the medicine markets in a particular country or 
trading area, and investigations of cases in which falsified or 
substandard medicines reached markets26–31. These provided 
additional insights about factors likely to affect medicine 
quality, especially in middle-income markets, and contributed 
to our choice of country case studies. Salient factors increasing 
risk included market structures that facilitate arbitrage or parallel 
trade (to which Romania is subject), very rapid scale-up of health 
service provision (all study countries), decentralised or otherwise 
complex government and regulatory structures (Indonesia, China). 
Protective factors included effective single-payer systems and 
strong information systems, both present in Turkey.
Country case studies
Table 2 provides key characteristics of the countries selected 
for case studies.
The particular focus of each country case study influenced the 
choice of informants approached for interview. China is the 
largest producer and exporter of active pharmaceutical ingre-
dients (API) in the world; it also has a complex decentralised 
regulatory structure. We chose to focus on the interaction 
between international, national and state-level factors influencing 
quality assurance of Chinese API in Zhejiang province, the 
country’s largest producer and exporter of active ingredients 
and home to four of the world’s top ten producers, according to 
trade sources32. We thus spoke principally to manufacturers and 
regulators in Zhejiang.
While health services in Indonesia were decentralised in 2001, 
the central government committed in 2014 to including all 
citizens in a single-payer health insurance scheme. Though three- 
quarters of the population is now covered, the scheme has been 
in deficit since its inception. We focused our case study on the 
interaction between the radical changes to health financing and 
Table 2. Characteristics of countries studied.
Variable China Indonesia Turkey Romania
Population 2016 (million) 1,379 261 80 20
World Bank Income classification Upper middle Lower middle Upper middle Upper middle
Health spending per capita, (US$ PPP 2015) 779 383 1029 1128
Annualised growth in health spending, 1995–2015 (%) 10.1 5.6 3.1 5.9
public or insured % of health spending (2015) 67 52 83 79
Generics as % of domestic drug consumption, by 
volume 80 70 56 60
Value of domestic pharma production, 2016 (US$ 
billion) 249 3 (2014) 17 (2015) 3
Health financing model (with % covered, 2018) Social health insurance
Single payer 
insurance (74%)
Single payer 
insurance (98%)
Single payer 
insurance (74%)
Focus of country sub-study Production of API Scale up of national insurance Track and trace
National and 
regional regulation
API, active pharmaceutical ingredient.
Sources: World Bank and International Health Metrics and Evaluation databases (available through 33,34)
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the quality of medicines, speaking to stakeholders across the 
system.
Turkey undertook a similar transformation in health financing 
a decade earlier, and has more recently invested in widely praised 
medicine tracking technology. The Turkish case study paid 
particular attention to the genesis of this technology, and the 
factors that facilitated or threatened its implementation; many 
of the interviewees were directly involved with or impacted by 
these efforts.
Romania is one of the newest and poorest members of the Euro-
pean Union; out-of-pocket spending on health is close to 40% 
higher than the EU average33. Successive governments have 
promised to reduce medicine prices, but must do this within 
the EU’s single market, while Romanian pharmaceutical 
companies must comply with EU standards. The Romanian case 
study included interviewees from across the supply chain, and 
highlighted the interaction between national and regional goals, 
regulations and markets.
Table 3 shows the number of interviewees in each country 
case study.
The particularities of each country focus will be reported sepa-
rately. The remainder of our results present the common dynam-
ics that we found across these different country case studies, 
and the analytic framework that arises from them.
Political promises and policies affecting the market 
for medicines
We found that political promises, and the policies intended to 
deliver on them, fundamentally shaped the market for medicines 
in all study countries, with more uniformity on the demand 
side of the market than on the supply side. Because the Chinese 
study focused on the API market, we do not include specific 
information on the demand side for formulated medicines in 
China.
Demand for medicines
In all of the study countries, governments have promised to pro-
vide virtually all citizens with affordable access to health care. 
Scaling up service provision to deliver on this promise clearly 
increases the size of the market for medical products.
The health financing mechanisms that aim to deliver UHC 
differ in Indonesia, Turkey and Romania, but all include high 
degrees of public subsidy. This, combined with rising demand, 
puts pressure on public budgets, and makes cost containment a 
priority. Procurement policies have thus increasingly focused 
on bringing down the price of medicines. Other health system 
measures have reinforced these efforts, as shown in Table 4.
Some of these measures are incomplete or inconsistently imple-
mented. For example, infrequent updating of prices in response 
to changes in reference prices or exchange rates disrupted 
markets in Romania and Turkey. In Indonesia, inclusion on the 
national formulary precedes cost-effectiveness analysis (which is 
only performed for limited classes of drugs, such as oncology). 
This reduces the state’s bargaining power in auctions.
However, taken together, cost-containment measures have effec-
tively reduced the price paid for many medicines in the study 
countries35–39. 
Supply of medicines
China’s government includes pharmaceutical industry growth 
in its national development plan, “Made in China 2025”40. In 
all countries, however, we found many, more general political 
promises that have implications for the supply of medicines. We 
group them under the category of “national prosperity”; they 
encompass areas as diverse as economic wellbeing, environmental 
health and promotion of religious interests.
Table 3. Number of people interviewed, by country and respondent type.
Interview subject China Indonesia Turkey Romania Total
Manufacturers/Pharma industry groups 5 4 2 3 14
Brokers or distributors 5 2 1 4 12
Health care practitioners - 8 1 5 14
Ministry of Health - 4 3 2 9
Medicine regulator 7 2 * 1 10
National insurer - 1 2 1 4
Technical agencies for pharmaceutical policy 2 2 6 3 13
Academic - 2 1 - 3
Patient, media, civil society - 6 - 3 9
Total 19 31 16 22 88
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Table 5 details some of the policies we encountered, with their 
real or potential effect on the supply of medicines. Many of these 
effects are unintended, but they have very real consequences 
for companies seeking to supply the medicines market.
While membership of the EU promised prosperity for Romania, 
for example, compliance with European good manufacturing 
practice (GMP) regulations pushed the price of domestic medi-
cines up by over 30%, and led to the closure of some companies, 
according to reports in the financial press43.
Similarly, in China, thousands of factories manufacturing 
chemicals for the medicine market were closed down as a con-
sequence of policies designed to improve the physical environ-
ment. This increased the price of some products, and created 
severe shortages for others.
 “Our company’s sales revenue dropped 4% [in 2017]. In 
monetary value, we lost 100 million RMB on sales. The 
most important reason was that many chemical manufac-
turers were closed down. Now the situation is: we have 
clients, for example those from India request certain prod-
ucts, but these products are no longer manufactured. So, it’s 
very frustrating that we have business opportunities, but no 
products to sell.”
          Chemical/pharmaceutical trading company employee, China
The policies affecting the supply side have wide-ranging 
effects, but the majority that we encountered tend to increase 
the cost of producing medicines or of importing them in to 
national markets.
Combined market effect
Most markets are the product of supply and demand. Figure 1 
shows schematically how political promises and the policies 
that operationalize them shape the market for medical products 
in the countries we studied. The combined effect of lower 
prices and higher production costs is to squeeze profit margins 
for producers and distributors of medicines. And yet most of those 
companies—domestic and multi-national, innovator and generic, 
and including the state-owned enterprises in the countries we 
studied—are profit-oriented and will act to protect their profits.
We thus turn our attention to the actions they take, which we 
cluster into three areas: cost-cutting, avoidance of loss-making 
markets and products, and promotion of high-margin products. 
For each area we describe the action, the results of that action, the 
steps that are taken to mitigate the risks by medicine regulators 
and others, and the limitations of mitigating action.
Market response 1: Industry protects margins by 
cutting costs
Where procurement or other policies make it hard to raise 
prices, producers and distributors of medicines try to protect 
margins by cutting costs. They may increase efficiency, seek 
economies of scale or increase mechanisation. They may also 
seek cheaper suppliers or skimp on quality assurance procedures.
 Q: Is there an effect, where, because of the low offering 
prices, the components of medicines are compromised?
 A: Yes, definitely. Starting with the raw materials. That’s 
the first thing, manufacturers are going to look for the 
very cheapest API, they’re going to look for a cheaper 
supplier. Next is the way they make the medicines avail-
able. For example, they might have started with blister 
packs, but they’ll change those to strips, something cheaper. 
Basically, they’re looking for ways to make more profit.
                                          Pharmaceutical manufacturer, Indonesia
An API producer in China confirmed the close link between 
price and product quality, reporting that controlling a particular 
impurity at 0.1% or less could increase the price of a 
Table 4. Policies aimed at containing the cost of medical products.
Measures Indonesia Romania Turkey
Procurement measures
National formulary Yes Yes Yes
Internal reference pricing Yes Limited Yes
External reference pricing Yes Yes
Other pricing policies Yes Yes Yes
Global budgeting No No 2010-2012
Restriction to INN generics Yes Yes No
Public auctions/price transparency Yes Yes Yes
Other health system measures
Clinical guidelines Limited Yes Yes
Health technology assessment Limited Yes Yes
INN, International non-proprietary name. 
Sources: Interviews and 7,41,42.
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chemical by 20% or more. Prices of Chinese API vary by 
destination market; importers in the United States pay approx-
imately three times as much per kilo on aggregate as do 
importers in Africa48.
Risk to product quality: substandard production or 
degradation
Reducing the quantity of active ingredient to save money will 
lead directly to a substandard product; buying cheaper API 
is likely to do the same. Lower-cost excipients may alter the 
way a pill dissolves or otherwise reduce its bioavailability, and 
thus its efficacy, and may also increase the risks of degradation.
Choosing cheaper packaging or under-investing in distribution 
mechanisms, including adequate temperature control, increases 
the likelihood of degradation49. Meanwhile, cutting corners on 
quality assurance creates risks of mistakes during the produc-
tion process; this can cost hundreds of lives, for example when 
breaches of standard operating procedures lead to chemicals 
being switched inadvertently50.
These effects are represented schematically in Figure 2.
Mitigating actions: inspection, surveillance, prequalification
Cost-cutting should not affect product quality as long as produc-
ers observe GMP and distributors adhere to good distribution 
practice (GDP). In most countries (including all study coun-
tries) the medicine regulator periodically inspects factories 
and supply chains, and issues GMP and GDP certificates.
However, in part because of limited resources, this process is 
far from water-tight. Political pressure to protect local industry 
also sometimes obstructs nationally-mandated inspections:
 “Sometimes regulation can be difficult. For example, we 
are not encouraged to impose tough regulation on some 
Figure 1. The effect of political promises and policies on medicine markets.
Table 5. Policies affecting medicine supply in study countries, and their effects.
Political promise Country Policy Effect
Economic growth Romania EU membership Pharma producers subject to EU standards; single market
Domestic jobs Indonesia Minimum 40% domestic components Threatens Indonesian pharma, which imports >90% API
Healthy environment China Reduce polluting industry Closure of major API producers
Protect religious 
interests Indonesia
Halal law, requires halal certification 
of all medicines Potential withdrawal of imported products
Fiscal responsibility Romania, Indonesia Taxation, incl. clawback tax Increases tax burden on pharmaceutical firms
Sources: Interviews, and 44–47
Page 8 of 25
Wellcome Open Research 2019, 4:70 Last updated: 05 JUN 2019
enterprises which are highly valued by local governments. 
Local governments will step in and protect those enterprises.”
                                                                 Medicine regulator, China
The result of inspections by regulators are not always taken 
into account by purchasers. In Indonesia, for example, a valid 
market authorisation is the only indicator of product quality 
required in public procurement41. However, market authorisa-
tions remain valid for five years, and are not routinely revoked if 
GMP certification is withdrawn following an inspection, allowing 
continued procurement of potentially substandard products.
National regulators are not mandated to inspect production 
or distribution of products for export (although the EU requires 
exporting country regulators to provide GMP certifications 
for the API it imports). The onus for quality assurance thus 
lies with the importer’s regulator, but few countries have the 
resources to send inspectors to plants in countries from which 
they buy products, while pre-import GDP inspection is largely 
absent51.
A Chinese manufacturer explained how this may lead to a 
“two-track” system for product quality:
 “If the requirement is 0.1% [maximum impurity], a good 
manufacturer would refine up to 0.07-0.08%.... But some 
manufacturers would want to save cost and just reach the 
borderline point. It happens that test result from our clients 
shows 1.1% and they can’t accept the product. …What 
happens next would depend on the status and bargaining 
power of both sides. If we supply [a top-10 multinational 
pharmaceutical firm], no doubt the product will be returned 
and we will have to make new ones for them. If we supply 
middle-end customers whose downstream markets are not 
well regulated, for example the African market – we are not 
discriminating Africa, but it’s true their state regulations 
are not so strict – in that case, we may be able to persuade 
the client to use the product, by offering for example 5% 
further discount.”
                                                                   API manufacturer, China
We also found evidence that even the most stringent regulatory 
authorities take the needs of their domestic industry into account 
when considering enforcement of GMP, including in other 
countries. A Chinese manufacturer described the outcome 
of an inspection of their factory by the United States Food 
and Drug Administration:
 "The USFDA [issued an import prohibition] for all our 
products at first. But for a few of our products, [we] are 
the unique producer, and the US often faces shortages of 
these products, so FDA very soon released the prohibition 
on these products."
                                                                   API manufacturer, China
Importing countries unable to inspect factories in exporting 
countries may choose to buy products that are quality-assured 
at source under a WHO-implemented prequalification system52. 
This system currently only covers medicines or vaccines for a 
few infectious diseases, and some reproductive health products.
Where GMP/GDP inspection at/from source is not an option, 
regulators may attempt to mitigate the risk of substandard 
products reaching patients through post-market surveillance. 
However, we found that in low and middle-income countries 
Figure 2. Cost-cutting in defence of profit creates risk for substandard medicines.
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most post-market surveillance is performed using screening 
tools capable of spotting falsified medicines and incorrect API, 
but inappropriate for identifying poorly formulated or degraded 
products53.
Where substandard products are identified, full track-and-trace 
systems such as that in use in Turkey greatly facilitates rapid 
recall, minimising public health damage.
Market response 2: Industry protects margins by 
avoiding unprofitable products or markets
A second response to low margins is to simply avoid products or 
markets that do not contribute to a company’s profits. In the three 
years after Romania effectively capped prices at the EU mini-
mum while charging producers a claw-back tax, manufacturers 
withdrew around 2,000 of 6,200 products39. Many of these 
were lower-priced generic medicines.
 "Authorities [explaining supply interruptions] say 'No, no, 
you've had production problems'. But the truth is that it's 
very simple to explain the decision not to produce a drug 
as long as it brings you losses."
                                                  Technical agency advisor, Romania
While domestic companies stop manufacturing loss-making 
products, multi-national firms, whose profit calculus is global, 
have the option of simply avoiding loss-making markets. They 
may do this for a single product, by refusing to register it in 
country, or they may withdraw from a country entirely. One 
multinational firm shut down their generic production lines in 
Indonesia after the government introduced new procurement 
rules to contain medicine costs, citing commercial pressures54.
Multinational manufacturers also stay away from low-priced 
markets to avoid being benchmarked by countries that use 
external reference pricing to establish domestic prices.
 "Innovative medicines do not come…because they know 
the Turkish market will pull down prices [in other markets], 
unfortunately. [Manufacturers] do not want to get themselves 
into something like that."
                            Academic pharmaceutical market analyst, Turkey
Finally, manufacturers restrict distribution of expensive products 
to countries with lower prices for fear that profit-seeking brokers 
will buy them up and resell them in higher-priced markets, thus 
eroding the manufacturers’ profits. Both Turkey and Romania 
reported this behaviour, although Romania was especially 
vulnerable because trade regulations allow for the free trade 
of medicines between EU countries that implement different 
national medicine pricing policies.
Distributors can reduce costs by distributing only to areas with 
good infrastructure. In Indonesia, authorities turn a blind eye 
when distributors protect margins by withholding products from 
remote islands, where distribution costs are high:
 "Most important for the authorities is that there's no nation-
wide stock-out. They just let [a shortage] go for remote 
regions, because they recognise [the government] auction 
prices are very low."
                                          Pharmaceutical manufacturer, Indonesia
Interim risk: Shortage of clinically indicated medicines, 
incentive to buy from unregulated suppliers
The result of all of these actions: shortages of quality-assured, 
clinically indicated medicines.
 "In order to gain political capital, [campaigning politi-
cians] kept saying “we’ll give you the cheapest medicine 
in Europe.” Wow, how great they are! We’ll vote for them! 
Without thinking that you won’t have access [to the medi-
cines]. Because no one brings them anymore, because it’s 
not economically justified anymore, it’s not a business 
anymore. And those that are economically viable leave 
the country through parallel export. Romanians end up 
without medicine in one case or the other."
                                                                Patient advocate, Romania
Both patients and physicians respond to these shortages by 
stepping outside of the regulated supply chain to acquire the 
medicines they need. A Romanian doctor, showing researchers 
vials of magnesium sulphate with no expiry date, carried across 
the border by a former patient in response to shortages, said:
 "What do I know about this vial? When it expires? I tell 
you, I know for how long I have it and if it turns yellow then 
for sure it’s not good anymore…. What does it do? It saves 
two lives. Of the mother, and of the baby…. [But] it may be 
plain water or poison."
                                                                               Doctor, Romania
Mitigating actions: system-wide planning; market making
Market withdrawal and associated responses are both commer-
cially rational and completely legal; they are responses over 
which the medicine regulator has very little control. Prevention 
of shortages of this type requires system-wide planning that 
accurately forecasts demand, and that incentivises adequate 
supply, for example by providing guaranteed sales to auction 
winners.
Strong information systems are a prerequisite for effective 
planning. Turkey, whose well-resourced medicine regulator 
operates semi-autonomously under the Ministry of Health, has 
the most effective information systems of the study countries. 
These include a Datamatrix system that tracks every transaction 
involving a medicine in the regulated supply chain, from manu-
facture to dispensing. The system was implemented in response 
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to widespread reimbursement fraud, estimated at US$ one 
billion55, that threatened the government’s ability to deliver on its 
political promise of UHC.
The system imposed significant costs on manufacturers, requir-
ing those that wished to sell in the Turkish reimbursed sector 
to adapt production lines. Even after internal and external 
benchmarking lowered prices, manufacturers participated in 
auctions because of the size and consolidation of the market.
"The customer is king. I pay the money, I determine the 
conditions. Turkey has such an advantage. [The national 
insurer] buys more than 80% of the market. They say: “If 
you are willing to give them under these conditions, then 
you can give your drugs. Otherwise, I’m sorry, go sell them 
in another country, don’t sell them to me.”
                        Multinational pharmaceutical manufacturer, Turkey
Reimbursement data matched with data from the track and trace 
system provides an early warning system for low stocks nation-
ally and locally, allowing for rapid procurement as necessary. 
Well-managed stocks and an adequate benefits package reduce 
the likelihood that patients will step outside of the regular 
supply chain in Turkey.
Indonesia also has a single-payer national health insurance, 
and has attempted through transparent, single-winner auctions 
to elicit low bids from manufacturers. However, unlike Turkey, 
Indonesia’s insurer reimburses against diagnostic group; it 
does not collect data on prescriptions or contribute data to 
the Ministry of Health’s demand planning exercise. In 2017, 
public sector purchases of paracetamol in Indonesia were just 
30% of the amount forecast in tender documents, while for 
iron folate, they exceeded forecasts by over a quarter56. 
Bidders must undertake to deliver volumes set in the tenders. 
However, there is no concomitant obligation on health providers 
to purchase those volumes, leaving manufacturers with poten-
tially expensive excess capacity and disincentivising participation 
in auctions.
Romanian regulators guard against shortages resulting from 
arbitrage by requiring daily reporting of medicine exports. 
Given recurring shortages, it is unclear whether these data are 
analysed38.
 Q: "Isn’t there a plan in place to prevent shortages [caused 
by parallel exports or market withdrawal]?"
Respondent 1 laughs uncontrollably.
Respondent 2, laughing: “If there is such a thing, it obviously 
serves no purpose.”
                                  National technical agency advisors, Romania
Market response 3: Industry and health service 
providers promote profitable products
Besides minimising losses, the pharmaceutical industry acts 
to maximise profitable sales. In all study countries, producers 
and regulators alike reported that companies actively lobby to 
get higher-margin products on to national formularies, as well 
as to encourage orders for these products from private sector 
hospitals and others with discretionary buying power.
As countries scale up public financing for health using cost 
control measures such as reimbursement by diagnostic group, 
profit margins for private providers of health services also come 
under pressure. Some seek to maintain income by ‘up-selling’ 
patients to medicines that are not covered by national health 
insurance, for example selling them originator brands rather than 
giving covered generic alternatives. This reinforces patients’ 
perception that price signals quality, and may contribute to 
demand for more costly products even when there is no shortage 
of quality-assured, cost-effective alternatives.
 “In my opinion, if a vaccine is more expensive, then 
automatically it's going to be better quality, and that’s that.”
                                                               Mother of infant, Indonesia
Interim risk: Unmet demand for premium products, 
incentive to buy from unregulated suppliers
Marketing and prescribing practices that create unmet demand 
for higher-margin products tend to raise costs to patients. 
Patients who want, but cannot afford, a premium product that 
is not covered by insurance may again step out of the regulated 
supply chain, seeking the desired product over the internet or in 
informal markets.
Sometimes, health care providers sacrifice due diligence and 
acquire medicines at a discount, selling them to patients at a 
premium to maximise profits.
 "Freelance" salespeople go from door to door, including 
to hospitals, offering drugs sometimes at rather low prices…
[The buyer] doesn't think about the improbable price, 
only about the profit.
                   Pharmaceutical industry association official, Indonesia
Mitigating actions: control of product mix, licensing of 
outlets, public awareness campaigns
Most countries try to restrict irrational use of medicines using 
the policies listed in Table 4. Of these, only market authori-
sation is generally controlled by the medicine regulator. In 
theory, market authorisation could be granted only to prod-
ucts that have been deemed cost-effective in health technology 
assessments57. This in not universally the case in the study 
countries, so the procedure does not effectively curb irrational 
demand.
Regulators try to guard against freelance and cut-price sales 
and other unethical practice throughout the supply chain by 
certifying pharmacies and other dispensing outlets. Full track 
and trace systems, such as that implemented by Turkey, prevent 
the insertion of falsified medicines into the regulated (but not 
the unregulated) supply chain.
 "There is a “handshake protocol”. When you give it to me, 
you make a sale-notification, but it is still up in the air. If 
you do not make that sale-notification, and if the system says 
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when I scan the product: “There is no such thing,”, then 
I’ll tell you: “I cannot buy this, because I cannot sell this.”
                        Multinational pharmaceutical manufacturer, Turkey
Some countries have launched public awareness campaigns 
to warn patients of the dangers of buying medicines from 
unregulated sources. We found little evidence of the effective-
ness of these strategies. Rather, the most effective strategy we 
encountered was that adopted by Turkey, which was to remove 
the incentive to go outside of the regulated supply chain by 
ensuring the availability and affordability (in this case through 
insurance coverage) of quality-assured products.
Risk to product quality: Market opportunity for 
medicine falsifiers
Commercial strategies to protect profit margins combine to create 
unmet needs and demand, and to push people to satisfy them 
outside of the regulated supply chain. Together, this creates 
a market opportunity for criminals who wish to sell falsified 
products. These dynamics are represented in Figure 3.
We observed these dynamics in both Romania and Indone-
sia. In Romania, the main driver was shortages of clinically 
indicated products due to product withdrawal and arbitrage.
 Coming back to your question – why patients buy medi-
cines from the internet – you have to know that the majority 
of them do this in full knowledge, because the state does not 
provide them with a treatment in time. They are desperate 
and take the risk and buy medicines from wherever 
they can. Desperation pushes them into consciously aggra-
vating their own situation, because is it known that many 
of these meds are fakes...And they bought them online, 
and also, from around the corner of the hospital. The 
saddest thing is that this trade also takes place next to 
the oncology institute.
                                                                Patient advocate, Romania
In Indonesia, though quality-assured domestic vaccines were 
available for free, physicians maximised profits by charging 
patients for expensive imported vaccines. At a time when there 
was a supply shortage of imported vaccines, some physicians 
based in private hospitals bought products at cut price from 
roving salesmen. In 2016, at least 1,500 children were injected 
with falsified ‘imported vaccines’, containing no active 
ingredients58–61.
Mitigating actions: surveillance, criminal investigation
While full track and trace systems can keep criminally pro-
duced products out of the regulated supply chain, they do not 
operate in informal markets.
As long as a market exists, and the likely profit outweighs 
the likelihood of getting caught, successfully prosecuted, and 
sentenced to significant loss of liberty or assets, criminals will 
sell falsified medicines. In many countries, penalties are slight 
and investigative mandates unclear. Limitations on the Indo-
nesian regulator’s authority at the time of the 2016 vaccine 
scandal facilitated the trade of falsified products in a supposedly 
regulated supply chain.
 “Regulation-wise, at that time, we were not allowed to 
inspect pharmaceutical services in hospitals. The parliament 
pushed us to know more [about the falsified vaccines]. 
Figure 3. Commercial responses to low margins create market opportunities for medicine falsifiers.
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But there was no way we would know about this in the first 
place. We could not get into those hospitals' systems.”
                                                           Medicine regulator, Indonesia
Once falsified medicines are in circulation, effective post-
market surveillance may interrupt their pathway to patients. 
Again, however, the reach of regulatory systems in unregulated 
markets is limited. The high-end products most attractive to 
falsifiers are also the least likely to be tested, because of the 
high cost of acquisition and reference standards.
Table 6 summarises the responses to market pressures that 
we encountered in study countries, and their effects.
Market risk framework for substandard and falsified 
medical products
Figure 4 brings all the elements discussed together into a 
single framework, which we dub the “Market risk framework” 
for assessing the likelihood that substandard and falsified 
medicines will reach a nation’s patients.
Figure 5, meanwhile, adds information which illustrates the points 
at which action by national medicine regulators may mitigate 
risk.
A narrated video walking through the framework is available 
in the study repository (see Extended data; 01_Pisani_et_al_ 
medicine_quality_market_risk_framework.mov) and on Vimeo.
In the study repository, we provide versions of the framework 
describing the specific factors that create risks for substandard 
and falsified medicines in our study countries, fully annotated 
with data from the studies (see Extended data; 05_China, 06_ 
Indonesia, 07_Romania and 08_Turkey13).
Testing the framework
We tested the framework against cases selected by col-
leagues at WHO from the GSMS database, as described in the 
methods section.
To illustrate the results from countries at different income 
levels, we provide brief annotated versions of the framework 
Table 6. Response to pressure on profits in study countries, and their potential effects on medicine quality.
Goal Action Interim risk Potential risk to product quality
Preventative action by 
medicine regulator
Preventative action 
by others
Reduce 
production costs
Use cheaper API Higher impurities
Domestic production: 
GMP inspection  
Imports: only authorise 
prequalified products
Use cheaper excipients Higher impurities, less bioavailability
Use cheaper packaging Degradation
Use less API Sub-therapeutic dose
Bypass quality assurance Production errors
Reduce 
distribution costs
Under-invest in control of 
temperature/humidity Degradation
GDP inspection. (For 
imports, only possible 
after arrival)
Limit geographical reach Localised shortages
Market opportunity 
for falsifiers, 
including in health 
facilities
Avoid loss-
making products Cease production
Shortages
Market opportunity 
for falsifiers, 
including in health 
facilities
Fair pricing
Avoid loss-
making markets Withdraw from market
Fail to register in market
Limit distribution
Seek profitable 
markets Arbitrage
Shortages 
in source 
market
Market opportunity 
for falsifiers 
including in health 
facilities
Fair pricing
Aggressive market entry Irrational 
demand for 
high priced 
product
Market opportunity 
for falsifiers, 
especially targeting 
patients
Consider HTA in granting 
market authorisation
National formulary, 
HTA
Aggressive marketing Clinical guidelines
Maximize profits 
from patients Up-sell to off-plan products
Comprehensive 
insurance coverage
API, active pharmaceutical ingredient; GMP, good manufacturing practice; GDP, good distribution practice; HTA, health technology assessment.
Page 13 of 25
Wellcome Open Research 2019, 4:70 Last updated: 05 JUN 2019
Figure 4. Identifying substandard and falsified medical products: a market risk framework.
Figure 5. Actions by national medicine regulators mitigating market risk.
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for GSMS cases with data in the public domain from the United 
States, Pakistan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. These can 
be found in the study repository (see Extended data; 09_WHO_ 
database_case_studies.docx13).
Overall, we found that the framework developed in middle-
income countries with aspirations to achieve UHC explained 
most of the factors driving the falsification of medicines in 
countries of all income levels, as well as the production and 
import of substandard medicines in lower income countries. 
However, some additional factors emerged in low income 
countries:
•    Substandard production is sometimes simply the result 
of limited technical capacity among producers;
•    Where most spending on medicine is out of pocket, 
people buy in informal markets for convenience and 
affordability, even when there are no shortages;
•    In heavily aid-dependent countries, procurement prac-
tices of donors can undermine national efforts to build 
sustainable markets and systems.
In addition, the framework, which focuses on national driv-
ers and deterrents, does not adequately capture the potential for 
cross-border exchange of information in guiding GMP inspection 
and post-market surveillance.
Discussion
Substandard and falsified medicines have increasingly been iden-
tified as a neglected challenge to global health62,63. Efforts have 
been made to describe the causes of poor-quality medicines, 
and to identify appropriate responses to the threat they pose4,7,8,22 
However, none has provided a comprehensive, evidence-based 
framework which simultaneously:
•    Elucidates the system-wide policies that incentivise and 
facilitate the production, trade and consumption of poor 
quality medical products;
•    Differentiates those that drive substandard production 
and degradation from those that create opportunities for 
falsification;
•    Maps specific regulatory responses on to specific path-
ways, highlighting the likely effects of different investments 
and policy choices.
By comparing detailed case studies in four countries, and test-
ing the results against recorded cases in other countries, our work 
has provided a framework which disentangles the many fac-
tors previously grouped under broad headings such as "limited 
access to quality medicines", "poor governance" and "restricted 
technical capacity". We provide granularity to help guide 
national plans to prevent, detect and respond to substandard 
and falsified medical products.
The study shares the limitations common to qualitative research 
regarding subjects involving illegal or unethical behaviour. 
While we worked hard to include a wide range of participants 
and to stress that data would be anonymised, some potential 
respondents declined interview while others, particularly from 
government institutions, gave normative responses. However, we 
were able to capture a wide range of opinions and experience, 
including detailed descriptions of unethical practices, giving 
us confidence that our results are sufficiently comprehensive.
The four middle-income countries studied shared character-
istics that are not reflective of all nations; when we tested the 
framework against cases reported in other countries, we identified 
refinements which may be necessary in adapting the framework 
for lower income settings.
Our results did, however, prove robust across a wide range of 
settings. They suggest that when the incentives driving demand 
for affordable, cost-effective medical products are aligned 
with the rewards for producing and distributing those products 
at assured quality, substandard medicines will be rare, and 
there will be little opportunity to profit from the sale of falsi-
fied products. However, it is currently hard to align production 
incentives with rewards, because the forces shaping demand 
are largely determined by national governments aspiring to 
maximise access to affordable care, while suppliers are motivated 
by profit, often calculated globally.
Much of the current discourse about medicine quality focuses 
on strengthening the capacity of national regulatory agencies 
to oversee the production or import of medicine products, and 
their distribution. Certainly, well-resourced national medicine 
regulators are critical in assuring product quality. However, 
our analysis shows that many policies far beyond the reach of 
the medicine regulator contribute to shaping the market for 
medicines, sometimes incentivising the production or import and 
sale of substandard or falsified products.
We find that unless quality is explicitly included in pricing and 
procurement policies, downward price pressures can actively 
incentivise the production of substandard medicines and facili-
tate degradation. No country can hope to achieve sustainable, 
effective UHC without quality-assured generic products, yet 
low-profit-margin generic products are especially vulnerable to 
corner-cutting in response to price pressures.
A key safeguard is thus to ensure that prices cover quality 
production and distribution, as well as fair profit. This is an 
unpalatable message. "Fair profit" is hard to determine, since 
manufacturers rarely disclose real costs64,65. Further, profit is often 
conflated with profiteering in discussions of pharmaceutical pric-
ing, while the fear that innovator producers hope to undermine 
public confidence in generic products discourages discourse 
around quality assurance for low-cost products. Meanwhile, 
large exporters of generic products often respond to calls for 
more quality assurance by accusing more expensive producers 
of covert protectionism66–69.
A further safeguard against substandard production is close 
regulation of manufacturing practice. We find evidence, however, 
that a political commitment to the promotion of domestic manu-
facturing may put pressure on regulators to lower standards 
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for GMP or product quality inspection. This is worrisome in a 
climate of increasing economic nationalism in many middle- 
income countries, including those needing to find new sources 
for medicines previously supplied by the Global Fund for 
AIDS, TB and Malaria70.
The current global system concentrates the burden for qual-
ity-assurance on medicine regulators in over 190 consuming 
countries, rather than in a handful of major exporting nations. 
Adequate quality assurance of products made for export would 
increase efficiency in a globalised pharmaceutical market. This 
is a political rather than a technical challenge, but models exist 
in other sectors, such as aviation71. More cost-effective, stream-
lined regulation could eat into fees that national regulators 
now earn for often duplicative authorisation procedures, but it 
would cut costs for quality manufacturers, reducing the risk of 
product withdrawal and shortages.
Product shortages, as well as the quest for affordability or profit, 
can push patients and health care providers out of the regu-
lated supply chain, creating opportunities for falsifiers. As the 
Turkish case study demonstrates, the existence of a consoli-
dated market in which both patients and producers are relatively 
well protected against excessive price pressures is an effective 
protection against this risk. Market-based solutions such as 
this appear more effective than attempts to tackle falsification 
primarily through product regulation16.
Conclusion
As The Lancet Commission on Essential Medicines observed, 
UHC cannot be achieved with poor quality pharmaceuticals1. 
We thus conclude that organisations and governments aim-
ing to ensure UHC must consider the potential impacts of 
procurement rules as well as industrial, environmental and trade 
policies on the quality of medicines, and support and implement 
systemic approaches that provide fair reward for the production 
and distribution of quality-assured, cost-effective therapies.
There is considerable scope to validate the market risk frame-
work in different country settings, and to use it in combination 
with well-designed quantitative surveys to better understand 
the scale of the problem and to address the locally-specific 
drivers of vulnerabilities to poor quality medical products at the 
systemic as well as the national level72. Distinguishing between 
risk factors for substandard medications and falsified products 
can also guide choices about post market surveillance equipment53.
The framework also functions as diagnostic tool to identify 
market and regulatory failures that have incentivised or facili-
tated a specific case of falsification/substandard production. We 
encourage its adaptation to local circumstances, and its use in 
ensuring that the call for greater “access to medicines” reliably 
means “access to medicines that work”.
Data availability
Underlying data
The interviews that underlie this study discuss sensitive and at 
times illegal behaviours. During our informed consent procedure, 
we assured participants of anonymity. We are unable to 
comply with that commitment if we make the recordings of the 
interviews available. We believe there is an unacceptably high 
risk of disclosure in sharing full transcripts, and believe fully 
redacted manuscripts may be of limited value.
Our detailed coding structure is published in the study reposi-
tory. Researchers from universities and accredited public-interest 
research institutions are welcome to request specific coding 
queries. Please contact the Medical Ethics Committee of Eras-
mus University (metc@erasmusmc.nl), giving your name, 
institution, and the purpose for which you will use the data, and 
citing study number MEC-2018-016. Please copy your request 
to the Erasmus Data Service Centre (edsc@eur.nl) and to the 
corresponding author of this paper. If the ethics committee 
raises no objection, the research team will run the query as 
requested, redact the results only to the extent necessary to ensure 
anonymity, and pass the results on to fellow researchers, for the 
stated use only.
Extended data
Harvard Dataverse: Supporting data for: Identifying market risk 
for substandard and falsified medicines: an analytic framework 
based on qualitative research in China, Indonesia, Turkey and 
Romania. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0GGI9D13.
This project contains the following extended data:
•    01_Pisani_et_al_Medicine_quality_market_risk_frame-
work.mov
•   02_Coding_structure.docx
•   04_Bibilography.ris
•   05_China_case_study.docx
•   06_Indonesia_case_study.docx
•   07_Romania_case_study.docx
•   08_Turkey_case_study.docx
•   09_WHO_database_case_studies.docx
•   10_Medicine_quality_in_Indonesia.mov
•   11_Interview_topic_guide.docx
Reporting guidelines
Harvard Dataverse: COREQ checklist for article “Identifying 
market risk for substandard and falsified medicines: an analytic 
framework based on qualitative research in China, Indonesia, 
Turkey and Romania”. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0GGI9D13.
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Summary 
This paper attempts to investigate political and economic factors which drive the demand and supply of
sub-standard and falsified (SF) medicines. Using a grounded theory approach, the authors try to develop
a market risk framework for SF medicines. The main issue addressed by this paper is of significant policy
relevance and impact. It is the first paper (to the best of my knowledge) which uses a demand/supply and
market risk framework to study this problem.
 
Below I point out a few areas in the paper where I would have liked to see greater depth in analysis or
clearer exposition of what this analysis tells us with a reasonable degree of confidence, and what parts
remains less clear.
 
Comments
The key hypothesis is that SF medicines are largely the result of market responses to demand for
lower prices/cost containment, industrial policy and environmental control pressures. There may
be other underlying root causes for the prevalence of SF. This is where the authors’ use of
grounded theory methodology (and the sampling approach used) falls a little short. The manuscript
does not provide much detail (there is some discussion on p13) on how they looked for
cases/instances that do not fit the main reasons they have identified, what they found, and did they
attempt to look at filling gaps in initial data collected to clarify uncertainties. This would have
allowed them to add more depth/density and allow a reader to fully understand which parts of their
grounded theory to have stronger confidence in, and which parts to have lesser confidence in.
They delve into this a little bit in the discussion section, but it would have been better to see a
clearer and more elaborate exposition of the negative cases in the main section which discusses
the market risk framework.
All the countries included in the sample have a high degree of health insurance coverage or some
form of pooling. To what extent would the findings of this study apply to out of pocket markets
without any price controls? Posing this question would help bring out the external validity scope of
this paper more clearly. It will also more clearly highlight other factors that lead to SF.
It will be useful for the authors to look at Boswell-Dean (2019)  which shows that price controls in1
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 It will be useful for the authors to look at Boswell-Dean (2019)  which shows that price controls in
India may have led to higher quality in the out-of-pocket medicines market.
The drivers for sub-standard and falsified medicines are often very different and the framework
developed by the authors and Figures 3, 4 and 5 clearly demonstrate that. It may be useful to
categorize them more explicitly in Table 6.
Shortages (due to different reasons) are identified as the primary driver for falsified medicines.
While this may be true for the 4 middle income countries studied, in many other markets, falsified
medicines are supplied to out-of-pocket paying patients even when the “genuine” product is in
abundant supply (although is priced higher). This sometimes makes the distinction between the
underlying reasons for sub-standard and falsified a little murky. Also, see Bate   (2011)  foret al.
some discussion regarding this.
While unclear if it applies widely due to the nature of the study sample, it is worth exploring if a
possible market response would be to differentiate drug quality according to the consumption
sub-market as in Bate   (2016) .et al.
While I understand purposive sampling based on market characteristics, using API market in one
country (China) and finished products in the other countries is not a very good comparison strategy
for building grounded theory. Cost containment from political pressures only directly effects
finished product producers. The effect of cost containment on finished product translates into a
much lower price effect on APIs (depending on the type of medicine only a small fraction of the
cost is API cost). Also, there is limited evidence that finished product producers pass-on their price
decrease pressures to API suppliers. Economics of API manufacturing is also much more volume
and fixed cost dependent so its better to make larger quantities and supply them at marginal cost
to other “non-consumption” markets.
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This is an impressive contribution to a particularly difficult-to-research issue in global health. While the
problem of substandard and falsified medicines and its potentially adverse health consequences is
well recognised, research has tended to focus on documenting the scale of the problem and
enumerating the contributory factors. This paper uses empirical case studies and review of secondary
literature to develop a 'market risk' analytic framework for use in mapping the political and economic
system dimensions of the problem in specific country settings. The framework is built on a literature
review followed by comparative analysis of qualitative interviews with relevant informants and
stakeholders in four diverse middle-income countries.  
This is a complex issue influenced by a range of interwoven factors, many of which are highly technical or
difficult to grasp for non-specialist readers (ranging from Good Manufacturing Practice and regulatory
standards to diverse market structures, the effects of differing insurance systems and international trade
arrangements). Given this, the authors do a good job in general of highlighting the key dimensions at play
without losing the reader in technical detail.  Occasionally a little further explication would be helpful, for
example in elucidating the role of arbitrage or the practice of auctions through which (it appears)
governments select a supplier for a required pharmaceutical product. 
The study design is generally sound and the use of semi-structured interviews is particularly appropriate
for gathering material on sensitive topics such as this. The authors could perhaps have made fuller use of
the substantial review of academic papers and press reports that they conducted by using an
established scoping review framework and by providing further details of the critical interpretive synthesis
conducted (these results are not included). The development of a coding framework based solely on the
secondary literature and its subsequent deployment for coding and analysis of the interview data is
somewhat unusual. Analysis of the qualitative case study material could have been enriched by
combining the use of this coding scheme with a more inductive approach, to allow development of
unexpected themes emerging from the interview data. A fully grounded theory approach would also have
included testing the authors' hypothesis against divergent/deviant examples. However, the more
structured approach utilised here does serve the authors' purpose of framework development effectively,
by focusing on the specific political and economic dimensions that may heighten risk for creating markets
Page 21 of 25
Wellcome Open Research 2019, 4:70 Last updated: 05 JUN 2019
 by focusing on the specific political and economic dimensions that may heighten risk for creating markets
for substandard or falsified medicines. Importantly, the authors identify different influences operating for
these two types of inferior product. The figures provide clear and useful diagrammatic characterisations of
the processes described, such as the effect of cost-cutting on the risk of substandard medicines.  
The conclusions are generally sound though broader statements could be better evidenced, such as the
framing assumption of the paper that downward pressures on prices are exerted by political promises to
deliver Universal Health Care. Only the implementation of such promises through legislation, regulation or
other government actions to reduce costs of medicines rather than the 'promises' themselves are really
relevant to this assertion; and since many governments are focusing efforts toward UHC primarily on
expanding health insurance coverage, some further discussion of the potential implications of different
health insurance arrangements on risks relating to medicine quality would have been helpful. 
Nonetheless, overall this is a sophisticated and impressive analysis that provides an original
conceptualisation that helps to clarify a rather murky field. It provides a potentially useful framework for
further country-specific analyses to disaggregate the various contributory factors that may influence
susceptibility for low quality and falsified medicines to appear in the market. Moreover, it rightly shifts
focus from product regulation, where efforts have mostly concentrated to date, to causal market
mechanisms; and it usefully pinpoints the need to differentiate the economic forces likely to result in the
appearance of substandard medicines from those that increase risk of falsified medicines being
manufactured and marketed.           
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resistance; treatment-seeking behaviour; qualitative and interdisciplinary research.
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
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, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work isLicence
properly cited.
 Charles Clift
Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House, London, UK
This is an interesting study of the drivers of substandard and falsified medicines which develops a market
risk framework based on four country case studies.
While the study identifies a number of factors that contribute to the problem, the methodology is not
entirely satisfactory. The choice of countries is somewhat eclectic - it is not quite clear why they were
chosen over others. The focus of the case studies is different in each case as is the occupational
distribution of the interviewees. 
The paper would have benefited from a more systematic analysis of the health systems and
pharmaceutical policies in each of the countries. The details on p.5-6 are quite cursory. This applies also
to the case studies themselves in the extended dataset. 
With regards to the central conclusion that "increasing political commitment to provision of universal
health coverage has led to public procurement policies aimed at lowering prices of medical products" I am
not sure that it is supported by the data. Public procurement has long sought to minimize prices, often
without due regard to medicines quality. UHC, to the extent that it involves greater public funding of health
services and a reduction in the number of patients buying their own medicines, could actually improve the
prospects for reducing reliance on falsified and substandard medicines. The fault lies in defective
procurement policies that do not properly factor in quality criteria and the reluctance of governments to
provide adequate financing. Where there is a substantial generic industry, as the report points out, there
is also political pressure not to enforce strict regulation. 
In that context, the report refers to the need to allow "fair profit" to ensure that quality standards are
maintained, but how to achieve that raises a lot of issues that are not pursued in any depth. 
On specific points:
The comment about the WHO prequalification programme on p.9 rather understates its importance
as the reference makes clear. It also covers diagnostics. 
On p.15 the list of additional factors in low income countries really needs referencing. 
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Partly
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
Partly
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If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
I cannot comment. A qualified statistician is required.
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Partly
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Reviewer Expertise: My qualification relates to work carried out some time ago on the definition of
counterfeit medicines and I have worked extensively on projects related to access to medicines in LMICs
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
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Specific questions
The authors have not made the interview data available. However, the explanation for this is fully
satisfactory.
Overall
There is great concern but little understanding about the prevalence, drivers and impacts of
sub-standard drugs. This paper is timely. It develops a framework, which while not necessarily
definitive, is useful. It gives insight into the issue of fake drugs by seeking to understand the drivers
for undesired behaviours leading to poor outcomes.
Introduction
Although there are pragmatic reasons for lumping “substandard” and “falsified” drugs and although
this is current WHO terminology, combining the two categories can be mis-leading as they have
very different drivers and hence different solutions. 
It is going too far to say that solutions for poor quality medicines in LMICs are known. There is an
argument that the solutions proposed, largely drawn from historical experiences in HICs, are
inappropriate and unworkable in the context of LMICs.
Methodology
The choice of countries requires more explanation. How many countries fitted the criteria chosen
by the researcher?
The number of participants per country is rather small, but probably adequate for this time of
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 The number of participants per country is rather small, but probably adequate for this time of
qualitative study.
Ethical approval for non-invasive research is rather a grey area. They should refer to national
guidelines that say local ethical approval is not needed for non-invasive research. Most countries
where we work require local ethical approval.
Results and Discussion
It would be useful to have information on the size of the un-regulated drug sector in these
countries.
The results capture very much the “received wisdom”. It would be interesting to have perspectives
of some of the “un-approved stakeholders” e.g. the people who buy drugs on line or sellers of
illegal products.
The paper very well documents the un-intended consequences of well-intended goals. They
should be more cautious in suggesting preventative actions as it is very likely these preventative
actions will have their own set of un-intended consequences.
The application to low income countries was perfunctory and a more in-depth analysis is
warranted.
Generally, very well written and error free.
“begs the question” does not mean “asks the question”.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Yes
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
Partly
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
No
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Yes
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